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Executive Summary
How much will it cost the United States to comply with
the Kyoto protocol?  The estimates range from over 4 percent
of gross domestic product and $348 for the right to emit a
ton of "greenhouse gases" to only .1 percent of GDP and $14
for the right to emit a ton of gases.
In the lowest cost scenarios, U.S. emitters purchase
rights to emit from other countries.  In the highest cost
scenarios, actual U.S. emissions have to be reduced by about
30 percent from what they otherwise would be.  Such a cut-
back would imply a massive shift from coal- to natural-gas-
fired electricity generation.  But even the low-cost scenar-
ios are excessively expensive because models of the atmo-
sphere predict that very little warming would be prevented.
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In December 1997, at the third conference of the par-
ties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change in Kyoto, Japan, delegates from approximately 160
countries, including the United States, agreed to reduce
"greenhouse gas" emissions by an average of 5.2 percent from
1990 levels during the years 2008-12.  The reduction as-
signed to the United States was 7 percent below 1990 levels.
Since the Kyoto protocol was signed, numerous estimates
of the costs of compliance with its provisions have been
issued.  For the year 2010, the estimates range from over 4
percent of gross domestic product and $348 for the right to
emit a ton of carbon to only .1 percent of GDP and $14 for
the right to emit a ton of carbon. 1  The estimates vary so
much because the underlying assumptions of the economic
models used to generate the estimates vary a great deal.
In the lowest cost scenarios, the United States does
not actually reduce its own emissions very much.  Instead,
U.S. emitters purchase low-cost rights to emit from other
countries.  In the highest cost scenarios, actual U.S.
emissions have to be reduced by about 30 percent from what
they otherwise would be. 2  Because coal combustion is so
CO2-emissions intensive, such a cutback would imply a mas-
sive shift from coal- to natural-gas-fired electricity
generation in the United States.  The shorter the time frame
over which this shift must occur, the more costly it is
likely to be.  If cheap existing coal plants are allowed to
produce electricity until the end of their economic lives
and are then replaced with natural-gas plants, the costs
will be much lower.  But even the low-cost scenarios seem to
have costs that are greater than the benefits, which are
mostly symbolic, because models of the atmosphere predict
that very little warming would be prevented.
____________________________________________________________
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The CEA Study
In July 1998 the Council of Economic Advisers issued
its analysis of compliance costs. 3  The council found that
compliance would be relatively cheap because we would not
actually cut back emissions very much in the United States. 4
 The belief that the United States could reduce carbon
emissions cheaply through rapid adoption of
alternative technologies, a strategy favored by federal
energy laboratories, 5 environmentalists, and the Clinton
administration, is not the basis for the low costs in the
CEA scenario.  Instead, we would purchase the right to emit
greenhouse gases from other countries (primarily the former
Soviet Union) that would not be emitting as many greenhouse
gases as they are entitled to emit under the quotas allocat-
ed by the Kyoto protocol.
The availability of surplus emission capacity in the
former Soviet Union stems from the use of 1990 as the base
year from which each country's emission reduction obligation
is calculated.  Soviet industry had not yet collapsed in
1990 and emitted much CO 2 because Soviet industrial boilers
and electric generators burned coal rather than oil or
natural gas and coal emits more CO 2 than oil or natural
gas. 6
Under the Kyoto protocol, 40 industrialized countries
have been assigned carbon-emission quotas relative to their
1990 emission levels. 7  If the European Union allows trading
of its countries' quotas only within Europe, a position
currently favored by the EU, then the price of permits
supplied by the former Soviet Union will fall, reflecting
the lack of European demand for them. 8  The CEA estimates
that under such a scenario, the costs of compliance with the
Kyoto protocol would be very low: around $14 per ton of
carbon emissions, an increase in the price of gasoline of
about 4 to 6 cents per gallon, and a total cost to the
economy of .1 percent of GDP. 9  If trading is allowed among
all Annex I countries and European countries can bid for
unused carbon-emission rights from Russia, the price per ton
of carbon emissions will be higher: approximately $61 per
ton. 10
The EIA Study
The most pessimistic estimate of the costs of compli-
ance with the Kyoto accord for the year 2010 comes from the
Energy Information Administration, an independent governmen-
tal agency that gathers and disseminates data about energy
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markets.  The EIA estimates that the worst-case scenario, in
which no trading of carbon-emission permits across countries
is allowed (and the United States has to reduce emissions to
7 percent below 1990 levels rather than buy permits to
emit), would result in a price for carbon emissions of $348
per ton, an increase in the price of gasoline of 66 cents
per gallon, and a total cost to the economy of 4.2 percent
of GDP. 11
The EIA and CEA estimates differ because they model
completely different scenarios.  But even if different
economic models are used to predict the cost of nearly
identical carbon-emission scenarios, the results can differ
substantially.  For example, if the United States reduces
carbon emissions domestically by the full amount required
under the Kyoto protocol without any international trading,
the EIA model predicts that the cost of a permit to emit one
ton of carbon will be $348.  The model used by the CEA
estimates that, without international trading, the cost of a
permit to emit one ton of carbon will be $193, a little more
than half the EIA estimate. 12
Why Do Models Produce Different Estimates?
Why do the estimates of different models vary so much
even when they model the same scenario?  The economic mod-
els, while technically quite complex, calculate their re-
sults through four conceptually straightforward tasks:
· Generate an estimate of the level of economic activi-
ty in the year 2010 in the absence of any policy chang-
es.
· Predict the level of carbon emissions in 2010.
· Calculate the cost of reducing carbon emissions to
their level in 1990 minus 7 percent as required by the
Kyoto protocol.
· Calculate the cost of reducing carbon emissions by
lesser amounts and purchasing the right to emit the
remainder from countries that emit less than their
quotas.
Thus the differences in predictions must arise from
differences in the four tasks.  The models differ in their
predictions about expected GDP and carbon emissions in the
absence of any policy changes. 13  But the models differ  
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even more on how costly it would be to reduce carbon emis-
sions by a given amount.  The cost differences stem from
· differences in predictions about the ease of transi-
tion from coal-fired to natural-gas-generated electric-
ity,
· differences in the rate at which energy efficiency
increases autonomously, 14
· differences in how energy costs translate into costs
in other sectors of the economy, and
· differences in how much consumers factor future
prices into current decisions.
The optimistic model used by the administration assumes
that electricity producers respond very rapidly to carbon
permit prices.  Existing coal-fired plants are carbon-emis-
sion intensive.  Thus, if they shut down and are easily
replaced by natural-gas plants at low cost, complying with
the Kyoto protocol is not economically costly. 15  Other
models assume that the transition from coal to natural gas
will be slower and more costly.  If coal-fired electricity
persists, then reductions in carbon emissions must come from
sectors of the economy other than electricity, transporta-
tion, for example.  And since petroleum combustion is less
carbon-emission intensive than burning coal, the consumption
cuts and hence the permit price required to achieve a given
level of carbon-emission reduction are greater than if the
cuts come from coal-fired electricity.
The differences in the estimates of the ease of transi-
tion from coal-fired to natural-gas-fired electricity and in
the rate at which autonomous energy efficiency increases
have important effects on the estimates of the costs of
complying with the Kyoto protocol.  For example, Charles
River Associates estimates that in 2010 the cost of reducing
carbon emissions to 1990 levels would result in a carbon
permit price of $142 per ton of carbon emissions.  To obtain
the administration's predicted permit price of approximately
$108 to $109 per ton, the assumptions in the Charles River
model about the transition from coal to natural gas must be
drastically modified. 16  The sensitivity of consumers to the
price of coal (and the cost of permits to burn it) normally
used in the CRA model must triple in magnitude to obtain the
administration's result.
The administration's results flow from the assumption
that when the total costs of a new gas-fired power plant
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fall below the present value of the operating costs of an
existing coal-fired power plant, the coal plant is scrapped
and replaced with gas, a reasonable and standard economic
assumption.  The less credible assumption is that all exist-
ing coal-fired capacity could be switched by 2010 with no
changes in natural-gas, steel, and labor costs or land use
and other permitting processes. 17
Other important differences exist between the models. 
The optimistic models assess only the direct costs to the
energy sector of complying with the Kyoto protocol.  Other
sectors of the economy are assumed to adjust costlessly and
instantaneously. 18  Fiscal and monetary policy is assumed to
adjust to maintain full utilization of resources in the rest
of the economy. 19  In addition, consumers have perfect
foresight in the optimistic models.
The less optimistic models, like the EIA model, assume
that the adjustments will not be smooth and costless and
that residential consumers will not have perfect fore -
sight. 20  In addition, the EIA model does not calculate the
benefits of permit trading directly.  Instead it only esti-
mates the willingness of the United States to pay for reduc-
tion (based on our marginal costs).  If other countries sell
us permits to emit at a lower price than our costs of emis-
sions reduction, the EIA cost estimates are too pessimis -
tic. 21
Do markets adjust quickly and costlessly or slowly and
expensively?  The answer varies across markets and depends
on the time involved.  Financial markets change most quickly
with the least stickiness in behavior.  Labor markets react
much more slowly to demand and supply shocks. 22  The natu-
ral-gas market is very nimble, but land-use decisions,
because they are often politicized through the zoning proc-
ess, are notoriously slow to respond to changes in relative
prices.
The lack of an explicit model of international trade in
the EIA model leads to costly estimates of compliance.  In
any market trade, the consumer has a maximum willingness to
pay for a product and the seller has a minimum price he is
willing to accept.  The difference is called the surplus, or
"gains to trade."  The division of the gains between seller
and consumer is a byproduct of the workings of the market
and is not consciously controlled by any of the partici-
pants.
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In the EIA representation of international trading of
permits, the permit price represents the maximum willingness
of U.S. fossil-fuel users to pay for permits; that willing-
ness is based on the costs of U.S. compliance if we had to
reduce our own emissions.  At the limit, we would be willing
to pay as much for a permit as it would cost us to reduce
our emissions by the amount allowed by the permit.  In such
a trade the U.S. buyer would get none of the gains to trade.
 Instead, all the surplus would go to the international
sellers.  Such trades are possible, but unlikely, unless all
the foreign sellers of permits collude to restrict competi-
tion among themselves.  Thus the EIA permit price estimates
represent a situation in which the countries of the former
Soviet Union (the likely sellers of permits) extract all the
surplus from trades because of their monopoly power.
Scientific vs. Empirical Validity of the Models
How should we evaluate the various scenarios in the
models?  First, economic models are simply a series of If-
Then relationships.  As long as the mathematical links
between the "Ifs" and the "Thens" are algebraically true,
the predictions of the model are scientifically accurate.
All the models used in estimating the costs of compli-
ance with the Kyoto protocol are scientifically accurate. 
But the relevance (rather than the scientific validity) of
the predictions depends on the plausibility of the assump-
tions (the "Ifs").  Both the highest and the lowest cost
scenarios rely on assumptions about situations that are
unlikely to occur.
The high-cost scenarios require the United States to
reduce emissions to 1990 levels minus 7 percent on its own.
 The cutback of approximately 550 million metric tons of
carbon emissions per year (approximately a 31 percent cut
from projected emissions in 2010) would require a massive
shutdown of coal-fired electricity capacity and a shift to
natural gas by 2010. 23  Such a shift is not unprecedented 24
but would exceed our recent experience in natural-gas plant
construction.  Since 1983 an annual average of 10 gigawatts
(that is 10 billion watts) of natural-gas-fired electric
generation capacity (33 typical plants) has been added.  In
the scenario in which the United States has to reduce emis-
sions to 3 percent below 1990 levels, 24 gigawatts of natu-
ral-gas-fired electric generation capacity (93 typical
plants) would have to be added annually from 2008 to  
2020. 25  The new plants would have to be built on the sites
of existing power plants to take advantage of the configura-
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tion of the existing transmission system.  Conversion of
existing coal plants to gas would be cheap but thermally
inefficient. 26
The importance of the high-cost scenario is not that it
is likely to occur.  Rather it demonstrates that carbon-
emissions reduction without a trading scheme would have a
large negative impact on the production of coal-fired elec-
tricity and require a massive investment in electricity
produced from natural gas.  Those two changes are likely to
generate political disputes involving coal unions and pro-
ducers and railroads (which would lose from a quarter to
over a third of their revenue) and about the siting of
natural-gas plants. 27  The political disputes make the costs
of compliance with the Kyoto protocol higher than a strict
economic analysis would suggest.
The lowest cost scenarios rely on international trad-
ing, flexible markets, and rational consumer behavior all
occurring by 2010. 28  The importance of the low-cost scenar-
io is not that it is likely to happen but rather that smooth
and rapid responses to changes in prices and general market
flexibility are essential to cost minimization.  Consumer
and institutional rigidities raise the costs of compliance.
A more likely scenario than either the absence of
trading or complete worldwide trading is trading limited to
Annex I countries and some rigidities in the responses of
firms and consumers to higher prices in the short run. 
Under a full Annex I country trading regime, the price per
ton for carbon emissions is predicted by all the models
(except that of the CEA) to be in the range of $100 to $130.
 The GDP losses are predicted to range from .4 to 1.7 per-
cent. 29
How much confidence should we have in the economic
predictions just described?  If experience is any guide,
they should be discounted.  The use of large-scale models to
predict the future costs of policy options does not have a
very good track record.  In 1975 Resources for the Future,
an organization respected for its economic analyses, pro-
jected that the total costs of nuclear plants in 1985-88
would be less than the total costs of equivalent coal
plants.  A set of costly nuclear plants came online during
the early 1980s, however, and electricity rates rose 60
percent from 1978 to 1982.  By 1990 nuclear plants had total
costs that were about double those for coal plants. 30  In 
its study of the energy crisis in the 1970s, the Ford Foun-
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dation used a doubling of real (inflation-adjusted) oil
prices from 1979 to 2000 in its models. 31  And many promi-
nent Carter administration officials and economists, includ-
ing James Schlesinger, Arthur Okun, and Richard Cooper,
stated publicly that, at current prices, oil reserves would
be gone by the 1980s. 32  Even as late as 1983, the World
Bank predicted that the mid-1990s oil price would be $64 a
barrel. 33  The actual price of oil in inflation-adjusted
dollars in mid-1998 was less than half its 1979 price. 34
Conclusion
The political struggle over U.S. compliance with the
Kyoto protocol is really a fight about the future of the
coal-fired generation of electricity. 35  How costly would it
be to eliminate coal-fired electricity generation and switch
to natural gas?
If we have to reduce drastically coal use in the United
States by 2010, the costs are likely to be high even if we
consider only economic factors.  Given the likely political
resistance of coal interests, the costs are likely to be
even higher.  For example, during congressional action on
the 1990 Clean Air Act, the last time the coal industry was
challenged, union miners almost won the right to taxpayer
compensation for any job losses that occurred. 36
The cheapest method of reducing the costs of compliance
with the Kyoto protocol for the United States is to reduce
our coal use very little and pay others to give up their
rights to emit.  Given the opposition of developing coun-
tries to participation in the allocation of quotas, the most
realistic trading scheme is likely to involve only Annex I
countries rather than the entire world and cost the United
States about 1 percent of GDP.
Natural-gas-fired electric plant costs are now competi-
tive with those of new coal plants, and most new electric
plants in the 1990s have been natural gas fired.  If that
trend continues, market forces alone, in the long run, will
diminish the role of carbon-intensive coal-fired electricity
plants. 37
So large benefits are the only reason to rush the
conversion from coal to natural gas.  But the amount of
warming prevented by full Kyoto compliance is likely to be
so small (.07 degree centigrade by 2050) that it will not be
easily measurable. 38  Even though markets are flexible and
the most costly scenarios of compliance are probably over-
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stated (given the track record of previous model predictions
of energy prices), the almost totally symbolic benefits of
the Kyoto protocol are not worth the real costs it would
create.
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